



SUSTAINABLE DIPLOMACY

- Defining principles and practices for an upgraded Dutch approach to international relations –

From...	towards....
	

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[1] Introduction¹: A plea for Sustainable Diplomacyⁱ

In 2016, a memorandum by the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) made a plea for 'diplomacy for sustainable development'ⁱⁱ. In 2019, the Federal Foreign office of Germany initiated a week entitled 'Diplomacy for Sustainability'. We argue that these frames can be considered a next stage in the development of diplomacy principles and practices – heavily influenced by the need to find answers on the one hand to a more instable and uncertain global economy, but on the other to enhance the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals that were introduced in 2015. The Dutch experience can thereby be illustrative for a number of general challenges that countries face in developing diplomacy frames that can not only serve primary (self)interests, but also contribute to the joint creation of global public goods and an inclusive world economy.

For longer periods of time, Dutch foreign policy has been focused on so-called 'economic diplomacy'. This already seemed to be a step away from traditional forms of diplomacy in which only political and security interests take central stage. Economic diplomacy represents a form of diplomacy in which the Dutch economic interest features more centrally. But this begs the question what these interests are, precisely. In addition to spending cuts, new policy instruments have also been developed over the last ten years – in particular aimed at creating public-private partnerships - the effectiveness of which has not yet been fully proven. At least not according to more mainstream monitoring and evaluation (evidence based) measurements.

The dual approach, however, also necessitates a (re) orientation towards the Netherlands' diplomatic efforts, which appears to have consequences for development and trade policy in particular.ⁱⁱⁱ This dichotomy in orientations has led to heated debates, especially when the financial consequences of the new policy for existing interest groups become apparent. Such discussions are hardly productive unless a more integrated and strategic vision of the intended diplomatic deployment is shared. What can, therefore, be regarded as the joint (bilateral) interest of both the Netherlands and the recipient countries? For a small country such as the Netherlands in particular, an integrated–smart, pragmatic, but also targeted and sustainable–approach is essential. A more precise framing of the policy is therefore desired: from economic diplomacy, where it does not matter which trade flows are initiated (as long as there are many), to sustainable diplomacy, or 'diplomacy for sustainable development', which involves much more thought about the quality, the objective and the long-term implementation of these relations. Central to this is how to provide diplomatic support for broad objectives in the field of sustainable development goals.^{iv}

This paper first focuses on the institutional context. It shortly follows the discussion on how best to organise Dutch foreign policy interests: in separate or merged ministries; and on what topics with what vision (section 2). Like in many countries, the Dutch history is one of institutional configurations and reconfigurations in which ministries split-up and merge in an effort to create a more effective and coherent policy environment towards international economic, political, cultural and developmental interests. The outcome of the Dutch context has been the introduction of 'economic diplomacy' as leading frame. In this section we argue why we think that this frame is not adequate anymore for the ambitious objectives of Dutch foreign policy. A more appropriate framework is provided by so-called 'sustainable diplomacy', the basic characteristics of which will be explained in section 3. We define

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three phases of diplomatic development: from traditional, via economic to sustainable diplomacy. This leads to a number of principles that distinguish sustainable diplomacy from more traditional forms of diplomacy. Sustainable diplomacy is in our view especially needed to support the effective implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.

This ambition is not theoretical. The Dutch diplomatic history provides an interesting reality check on the difficulties of implementing such an effort, but also interesting experiments that are still under way. Section four shortly describes them. The Dutch have tried to implement parts of the sustainable diplomacy effort in the past and the present. With the lessons of these experiences in mind, we can then consider how a new sustainable diplomacy agenda would look like.

Finally section 5 illustrates the consequences of such a new strategic thinking framework, by looking at the way the sustainable diplomacy map of Africa can be redrawn if we take changing relations between the Netherlands and Africa into account. We also shortly show that this thinking can be applied to other regions in the world. On the basis of recent research, we created a sustainable diplomacy map for the relationship between the Netherlands and Latin America.

[2] The context: Heated institutional debates and how to proceed?'

Over the past decade, drastic changes have been made to three key policy areas of Dutch foreign policy and diplomatic orientation: (1) foreign policy in general and (2) development cooperation and (3) foreign economic relations in particular. Policy content was often preceded by institutional changes during this process.

First, the Ministries of Agriculture (the most international sector of the Dutch economy) and Economic Affairs were partly reorganized – with explicit attention to innovation and the so-called top sectors. The Department for Development Cooperation was further integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Subsequently, the Minister for Development Cooperation also became Minister for Foreign Trade and the Department of Foreign Economic Relations was transferred from Economic Affairs to Foreign Affairs. In 2017, the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Agriculture were partly split-up again. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was expanded to also include climate change, whereas the Ministry of Agriculture also had to focus on biodiversity in the Netherlands itself. The purpose of these exercises was, next to the obvious political reason to accommodate representatives of the constituting parties of the new coalition government, to improve coherence in foreign policy and to create a more evident link with Dutch economic activity. At the same time, cutbacks were made to many budget items, the relationship with business and social organisations was further defined and new policy instruments – such as a so-called PPP (public-private partnerships) facility—were deployed.

The initiated institutional changes represent not only political circumstances, but also a considerable degree of logic. There has been little criticism of the fundamental rearrangement of international policy areas around clusters of trade and development or economics and climate. Criticism was mainly aimed at the simultaneous austerity operation and a lack of overall vision. Supporters of this operation talk about the need to modernise policy. Opponents speak of the destruction of capital because knowledge and networks built up over many years are being dismantled. In both cases, however, there is a plea for further elaboration on the 'bigger story'. What vision underlies all these changes: austerity or real reorientation, only Dutch corporate interest or common interest, and how is this implemented in practice?

Significant changes always cause unrest. When several embassies (i.e. in Zambia) were closed, employers united in VNO-NCW, for example, protested. When the total budget for development cooperation was cut, the main co-financing organisations in particular were up in arms. Recently, the four largest Dutch development organisations faced a threat to lay off 25-50% of their staff, as they would cease to receive institutional funding from the Ministry of Development Cooperation as of 1 January 2016 and were to be financed based on competitive proposals (particularly as part of the 'advocate and influence policy framework', which was established in 2014^{vi}, supplemented in 2016 by the 'Voice' policy framework).^{vii}

The debates focus mainly on the consequences of the initiated policy changes and the unequal distribution of costs and benefits. However, there seems to be reasonably broad agreement that Dutch foreign policy needed a thorough revision of policies and instruments. The criticism by the Scientific Council of Government Policy from 2010 on Dutch development cooperation policy under the title 'Minder Pretentie Meer Ambitie' (Less Pretension More Ambition) had played a catalysing role in this^{viii}. An important argument in this report was, among other things, that economic growth is more important for tackling poverty in the longer term than traditional (donor-driven) development aid, which also has many perverse effects and whose effectiveness was under discussion. Aid and trade can—or rather, must—go hand in hand, according to the WRR. The greatest changes in foreign policy, therefore, take place in the relationship with developing countries. The overarching goal of most of these adjustments is described as 'economic diplomacy'. Both Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs have adopted this concept as the main guideline and justification for new policy. With economic diplomacy, policy must meet two criteria^{ix}: there must be a clear interest for the Netherlands and the Netherlands must have real scope for influence.

Economic diplomacy has a fundamental and a financial component. Since 2011, the website of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation has featured the motto 'more economic diplomacy, less subsidy'^x. This is an unmistakable quip and nod to the controversial WRR report from 2010. The time was apparently ripe for a fundamental change in policy and the associated diplomacy. A government letter on the modernisation of Dutch diplomacy dated 8 April 2011 also states the ambition that policy must be more modern and flexible, and cheaper.^{xi} For development cooperation, for example, a choice was made for fewer partner countries (fifteen countries) and fewer sectors (focus in particular on water and food supply, but also continued attention to sexual and reproductive rights and health, and to safety and the rule of law, explicit attention to inclusive development was added later^{xii}). In the words of the Rutte-I government in 2011: "We do what we do best and choose the most fertile soil to do so"^{xiii}. The main challenge here is to integrate policy areas such as trade, foreign relations, supporting Dutch companies abroad and development cooperation. This requires a more effective deployment of the network of trading posts (embassies, consulates and so-called "Netherlands Business Support Offices"), whereby one of the ambitions is to no longer have separate political, economic or development cooperation departments at embassies.

Meanwhile, significant steps have been taken in the implementation of economic diplomacy, both institutionally and by introducing policy instruments. This does not mean that the debate has fallen silent, on the contrary. There are mixed responses from each sector to concrete policy measures, in particular where the government calls suspicion on itself that it attaches more importance to austerity, short-term self-interest or political opportunism than to a substantive view of new forms of international cooperation.

In an overview book on 60 years of development policy, three influential authors recently argued in favour of a fundamental review of development policy that should focus on: further political integration, broadening (e.g. through the SDGs), socialisation and a broader partnership approach, and

professionalisation^{xiv}. It is clear that modernisation requires reconsideration not only with regard to development cooperation, but that this concerns all international policy areas. For the time being, the connection between trade policy, top sector policy and development policy is negatively influenced by a poor framing of the policy.

In this contribution, we state that the dominant frame of 'economic diplomacy' is not adequate for the ambitious objectives of Dutch foreign policy. In addition to not providing enough guidance, it is not very inspirational and even insufficiently linked to the real Dutch interests. Competitors from major emerging countries such as India, China and Brazil are often better able to serve the "economic interests" of a host country (and their own). Economic diplomacy is, therefore, not as distinctive as some people think. Instead, we opt for the term "sustainable diplomacy" as a logical synthesis of traditional/classical diplomacy and economic diplomacy, with the addition of the diplomatic efforts to promote global public goods, as reflected in the goals for sustainable development on a global scale, but also with explicit responsibilities in the Netherlands proper. This is not merely about mutually connecting politics and business, but also about mutually connecting citizens effectively.

The remainder of this contribution explains (1) what the concept of 'sustainable diplomacy' entails and how it differs from economic diplomacy, (2) how it can be applied analytically to an entire continent and (3) what consequences can be drawn from it for a further interpretation of policy. The continent we will examine first and foremost is Africa.

[3] Vision development: from economic diplomacy to sustainable diplomacy

Traditional diplomacy

Traditional diplomacy refers to the conclusion of treaties and the establishment of diplomatic posts in order to optimise or maintain relations between states—especially through professional diplomats. The Italian diplomat Daniele Varè provided the most realistic (cynical?) interpretation of the 'art' of diplomacy: 'Letting someone have it *your way*'.^{xv} The diplomatic challenge is, therefore, different for large countries with more power than for small countries that have far fewer resources at their disposal. However, 'hard power' within an international state system also has its limitations. With an often informal and social attitude, diplomats, therefore, seek mutually acceptable solutions to the challenges that both states face regarding each other. With bilateral diplomacy, this can be about fundamental questions of war and peace between the two countries, although diplomacy can also relate to cultural exchanges, building friendships and looking after the interests of their own citizens abroad. Traditional diplomacy often focuses on the 'how' question and is of an interstate-like nature: with which countries must regular contacts be maintained and which diplomatic infrastructure (embassies, posts) is required to this end? There is also a difference between bilateral diplomacy, in which differences in power between countries and geographical proximity play a significant role, and multilateral diplomacy, in which groups of states enter into negotiations with each other. Small (rich) countries were often the strongest supporters of multilateral diplomacy in the past because relatively more influence could be exerted there. The importance of multilateral organisations, however, seems to be diminishing in favour of bilateral relations, whereby the big developing countries are also gaining influence. See G20 initiatives, or the increasing influence of the BRIC countries—including the establishment of a separate BRIC development bank—and the decreasing influence of the World Bank and IMF. Traditional diplomacy focuses strongly on (combating) sanctions and mitigating (potential) conflicts.

Economic diplomacy

Economic diplomacy focuses more on the "what" question of diplomacy and "consists of using government relations and government influence to promote international trade and investment".^{xvi} Economic diplomacy aims to open up markets for one's own business, and to tackle problems and barriers—caused by host governments—for one's 'own' companies operating abroad. Trade relations are usually reciprocal, although there may be an 'unequal exchange' whereby one country opens its borders, while the other keeps them closed or creates other (non-tariff) barriers that negatively affect the reciprocity of the relationship. Economic diplomacy has both sanctions and rewards. Investment relations are influenced even more than trade relations by the relative economic strength of the sending and receiving countries. Developing countries are generally recipients of foreign investments. For many developing countries—particularly middle-income countries—the flow of foreign investment has become significantly greater over the last decade than the transfers through development cooperation. The role of (economic) diplomats is to facilitate their own investments as much as possible, without necessarily paying attention to reciprocity. Economic diplomacy requires a network of missions that primarily facilitates trade between countries and trade missions in which companies, supported by diplomats and government representatives, visit a country in order to establish economic ties with it. Research shows that economic diplomacy generally has a positive effect on trade and investment flows, although the precise effect depends on the instruments used (export credits, trade missions, size and occupation of the mission network). A good cost-benefit assessment about, for example, maintaining an extensive embassy network, appears to be difficult to achieve in this context.^{xvii}

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Double Tax Treaties (DTTs) are frequently used bilateral instruments that are concluded to consolidate economic relations. The exact role that these treaties play in establishing good economic relations is not without controversy. Instead of facilitating mutual trade and investment, it is often claimed that these treaties primarily defend existing interests of large companies. Treaties are thus, in any case, part of active economic diplomacy. They are not only closed, but also terminated or suspended. For example, South Africa suspended the Bilateral Investment Treaty with the Netherlands in 2013, partly because it perpetuated an unequal relationship.^{xviii} Malawi renegotiated the Double Tax Treaty with the Netherlands. This resulted in a new treaty in 2015, whereby there is less opportunity to abuse the treaty to evade taxes in both countries—but especially in the developing country. The DTTs in particular play a role in the position and reputation of the Netherlands as an alleged tax haven. Developing countries have become increasingly critical of the role that DTTs play in channeling tax revenues from companies to low tax regimes. Based on the example of Malawi, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently renegotiating the DTTs with 23 other countries, with four African countries leading the way: Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia and Ghana.^{xix} The sustainability issue plays an increasingly important role in the renegotiations.

In economic diplomacy, governments and private companies act together. Internationally operating companies play an increasingly independent role, which leads to increased importance of the so-called 'commercial' and 'corporate diplomacy'. To a certain extent, economic diplomacy can also be seen as the use of hard power in diplomatic relations, particularly if a country such as the Netherlands has a number of large multinationals at its disposal that are market leader commercially and have plenty of funds (investments). and knowledge.^{xx} The discussion about the effectiveness of economic diplomacy is strongly coloured by the role that missions, treaties and trade missions play for Dutch business, based on the idea that this is also important for the Dutch economy. Based on this importance there is discussion, for example, about the extent to which the Netherlands should focus more on commodity diplomacy. A typical Dutch discussion is to what extent the use of the royal family in trade missions actually promotes the export of Dutch companies. It appears that permanent representation in the

form of an embassy has a considerably greater effect than state visits.^{xxixxii} Multilaterally, economic diplomacy is conducted through the World Trade Organization or specific provisions within the World Bank Group or the IMF, such as MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency): the investment insurance system of the World Bank group that can mitigate investment risks of specific companies.

Sustainable diplomacy

With the introduction of the concept of 'sustainable diplomacy' the emphasis shifts from (enlightened) political and economic self-interest of the Netherlands to a much more explicit common interest aimed at sustainable development on a global scale and the promotion of public goods and regimes that are needed to that end. In fact, it is this form of diplomacy that really asks 'for what purpose' and 'for what' one enters into diplomatic relations. Sustainable diplomacy is not just about generating as much investment and trade as possible, or having as few conflicts as possible with each other, but also explicitly about the quality and objectives of the relationship. For traditional and economic diplomacy, the tacit paradigm holds that open relationships always serve the mutual interest. It goes without saying that opinions are divided on this matter. What is in the interest of the United States or China does not have to be in the interest of an average developing country. For a smaller country such as the Netherlands, which has no real means of power but does have other *assets*, the pursuit of a common interest is much more a condition sine qua non for effective diplomacy. The discussion about the Dutch government's vision is, therefore, strongly influenced by the overall picture, the policy coherence and the associated vision. This requires a broadening of the *stakeholder* groups involved beyond states and companies, in the direction of citizens in particular.

In the definition of Constantinou et al., sustainable diplomacy deals with the way in which the preconditions can be created "*for the reconciliation of rival ways of living, the formation of durable relationships and the promotion of global peace and security*"^{xxxi}. In practice, this means harmonising the strategy of companies, civil society organisations (NGOs), individual citizens and (local) governments in order to achieve sustainable growth and development. The government and embassies are not only facilitators, financiers or brokers, but also have the role of active partner and initiator. Sustainable diplomacy, therefore, requires different types of relations and treaties between countries.

In the past, sustainability was mainly discussed multilaterally (Kyoto, Millennium Development Goals, Sustainable Development Goals). The question is whether this is also possible and desirable bilaterally. Research into bilateral treaties to which public goods ('*global public goods*') are more central, also shows positive effects on economic interactions. Environmental treaties, for example, appear to have a positive effect on economic interactions between countries, while greater mutual economic dependence has a conflict-reducing effect.^{xxiv} Sustainable diplomacy is more explicitly focused on rewards linked to mutually accepted (sustainability) goals that often transcend national borders. Sanctions are less effective. Not taking part in the Kyoto treaties, for example, has not created any problems for any country, apart from a loss of legitimacy and prestige. The same applies, for example, to non-compliance with the international obligation to spend 0.7% of the GNP on development cooperation. The idea of sustainable diplomacy has so far been applied mostly to environmental issues, but a stepping stone to the broader debate on 'global public goods', which are central to the definition of the Sustainable Development Goals, is obvious.

Principles of sustainable diplomacy

Bilateral sustainable diplomacy distinguishes itself from economic and traditional diplomacy by the following characteristics:

- **More quality, less quantity.** Trade policy is not only aimed at exporting as much as possible, but also at linking imports and exports. The explicit aim is to prevent unequal exchange relationships or to channel them in such a way that they become more equal in the long term.
- **More investments, less one-sided focus on trade.** Trade and investment relations are interlinked. The nature and direction of the relationship are explicitly considered. If, for example, investments are only linked to exports from the recipient country, it becomes important to examine to what extent this is about "exploitative" investments in which raw materials and labour are chosen in a country solely due to low costs. If investment flows are also linked to exports, a more equal relationship often exists, because companies take a longer-term interest in the recipient country. Attention must be paid to making investments and relations in the trade chain from producer to consumer more sustainable.
- **More inclusive, less exclusive.** Investments should ideally be linked to inclusive growth objectives of the recipient country, whereby employees are not only seen as cheap labour, but also as potential customers. Short-term interests are transformed into mutual longer-term interests. If sustainable diplomacy enables Dutch companies to serve broader layers of the population with valuable products, their license to operate can increase enormously. This can give them a sustainable competitive advantage, not only because of their embedding in the local communities, but also as a distinguishing factor from competitors who are much less willing or able to focus on this. Inclusiveness can also mean serving the growing middle class in developing countries, while carefully considering how the positive effects of this relationship can actually trickle down to the lower, poorer segments of society. More soft power, less hard power. (Hard power will yield less for a small country such as the Netherlands, in any case).
- **More (mutual) investments focused on sustainability, less subsidy only.** Particularly in the absence of institutional, physical and intellectual infrastructure, granting subsidies can still be important. This applies in particular to the most fragile states. In that case, the subsidy or donation must be temporary and in the long term generate demonstrable social, economic and ecological added value for both the receiving and the providing country. In the field of global public goods in particular, new subsidy models will have to be developed that contain a business case, whereby the subsidy component can be greatly reduced in the long term and the perverse incentives for subsidy dependence are minimised.
- **More coordination and integration, less compartmentalisation.** Sustainable diplomacy aims to ensure that as few parallel processes between various policy areas as possible continue to exist independently of each other. Diplomacy is focused on synergy. This means that there is less political or economic or social control, but efforts are more integrated and focused on mutual sustainable development. 'Social' without institutional and economic embedding entails predictable continuity problems. 'Economic' without social and institutional results in insufficient sustainable (inclusive) development. Less self-interest, more mutual interest. Less specific, more universal and coherent.
- **More needs-oriented, less supply-oriented.** In this respect, need is not necessarily the same as the market demand of a growing middle class, on which economic diplomacy is logically focused. In most developing countries, large need holes occur for groups of poor people who cannot necessarily express their needs in explicit purchasing power. This requires new arrangements and innovative solutions in which the interests of rich and poor, and of short term and long term, are more balanced.^{xv} Sustainable development requires linking issues that have often been considered isolated until now. Health cannot be considered separately from poverty; poverty and education are related; education and sanitation/hygiene are connected; water quality and good

governance are connected, etc. Embassies have a role to play in connecting needs such as knowledge coordinators, partners and brokers.

- **More partnerships, less specialisation.** As early as the 2011 Busan intergovernmental meeting, it was agreed that governments, businesses and civil society organisations should develop more partnerships and define joint projects. With sustainable diplomacy, the initiative of the relationship can lie with states, companies or citizens. Real partnerships are based on complementary strengths and also give each party sufficient scope to further develop themselves and to invest in their own strengths. The partnership cannot be based on one party that only gives money and other parties that execute. Financial transfers (grants) may be given temporarily, however, for the purpose of overcoming certain thresholds and enabling scaling up and learning. Philanthropic considerations only apply to very specific circumstances such as natural disasters and crises. Cross-sectoral partnerships are not a trade-off of various interests, but a way of bringing interests more in line with each other, creating common ownership and thereby having more, more focused and longer-lasting impact. Development cooperation (again) becomes international cooperation. 'Help' becomes 'partnership'. International cooperation evolves from an effort obligation (fixed% of GNP) to an outcome obligation (sustainable development and the provision of global public goods). Partnerships are aimed at strengthening these global public goods.

Sustainable diplomacy therefore requires the effective use of so-called 'soft power'. It has already been demonstrated that the use of soft power has a positive effect on exports between countries, but in this case sustainable diplomacy requires that soft power is systematically linked to the sustainability objective.^{xxvi} The principles of sustainable diplomacy can be applied to the relationship between all countries, regardless of their level of development. However, the most profit can probably be gained from the relationship between developed and developing countries. The frame of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals that has been adopted for the post-2015 agenda within the UN offers interesting starting points for this. However, as things stand at present, the SDGs, like the MDGs, are objectives without resources. The importance of sustainable diplomacy will, therefore, not diminish.

[4] Dutch experiments in sustainable diplomacy

The term 'sustainable diplomacy' is not yet being used in the official policy framework of the Netherlands. Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees who are responsible for international trade and development cooperation mostly refer to their own activities as 'economic diplomacy'. This does not mean, however, that no relevant experience with sustainable diplomacy has been gained. The Netherlands has already tried to link various policy areas around sustainability issues, albeit with mixed results for the time being. Four examples illustrate this in more detail.

Firstly, in the 1990s, the Netherlands set up so-called "Sustainable Development Treaties" with Bhutan, Benin and Costa Rica. These were intended to establish more reciprocal and equal relations with a view to achieving sustainable growth. An important element was the full participation of a large number of social players (local communities, governments, NGOs, companies) in the formulation, planning and execution of the activities. The idea was introduced as a learning experiment and as an example for other countries. However, the example was not followed, and in 2005 the Dutch government decided to phase out the program. Analysis of the Bhutan case concludes that the program can be considered a 'successful failure'—successful in Bhutan but failing in the Netherlands, due to a lack of a common vision and a fundamentally unequal relationship between 'donor' and 'recipient'.^{xxvii} In addition, a treaty proved to be an inadequate form of this new form of cooperation, partly due to the significant differences in interpretation between the treaty partners. Can this experience be used differently in the current constellation?

Secondly, since 2003, the Netherlands has been focusing on the so-called 3D approach whereby Diplomacy, Defense and Development are integrated. Military operations are linked to reconstruction, governance and development issues in order to offer a sustainable alternative to armed conflict in the longer term. A budget of € 250 million is currently allocated under the auspices of International Trade and Development Cooperation, but with co-decision powers for the Ministry of Defense. The intended countries are mainly so-called 'fragile states'. However, the integral approach of the 3D policy is under discussion. Points of criticism concern (1) dilution of 'real' development efforts, (2) ineffectiveness in achieving intended goals (see attempts in Afghanistan, for example), (3) the correct ratio between hard power (military) and soft power (economy, development), and (4) the quality of the strategic elaboration of the concept that leaves much to be desired, including with regard to^{xxviii} the question of when the instrument is best used (before, after or during a conflict). Many NGOs appear to find it difficult to participate in this concept in practice.^{xxix} The integrated approach can, therefore, still be greatly improved.^{xxx}


Thirdly, the importance of partnerships is increasingly referred to in the international debate on the review of development policy. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been extremely popular since the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002). Thousands of partnerships have now been concluded between governments, companies and NGOs. The importance of an integral and universal approach has been confirmed even more emphatically with the Sustainable Development Goals. Since 2007, so-called Schokland and Millennium Agreements have been concluded in the Netherlands, which involved entering into 54 very diverse partnerships. For example, more than € 100 million was allocated to the Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH), in which NGOs, companies and donors (including the Netherlands and Switzerland) work together to make raw materials chains more sustainable. Another example is the financing of the Access to Medicine Foundation, which aims to encourage pharmaceutical companies to increase access to medicines for poor populations, by means of rankings. State Secretary Knapen and Minister Ploumen subsequently initiated more policy instruments that try to link strong Dutch sectors with the needs of developing countries in a more focused and precise manner. The 'PPP facilities' around sustainable water and food security, in which more than € 300 million has been invested so far in several rounds, are particularly worth a mention. The so-called Dutch Good Growth Fund seeks to encourage small and medium-sized businesses in both the Netherlands and developing countries through a revolving fund of € 750 million in total.

Finally, there are examples of successful sustainable diplomatic initiatives with a more casuistic character. A good example is the agreement that was concluded in 2015 between Shell Nigeria and leaders of the Bodo Community, on cleaning up the oil pollution in their habitat. The agreement was negotiated by former ambassador Bert Ronhaar and channels a much larger, more long-term and highly complex sustainability conflict between Shell, international NGOs, local populations and governments. The agreement facilitated a breakthrough in a situation that represented neither the interests of the local community nor those of Shell (as it happens, Shell is actively withdrawing from some African countries). This example shows how important individual diplomats can be in sustainable diplomacy, and how much achieved solutions depend on their competence to make agreements with multiple parties—not only with governments and/or companies, but also with representatives of the local population and Dutch NGOs. The question remains how this experience in Nigeria can take a more structural form with regard to applications for the entire oil (and raw materials) sector and how it can be rolled out to other countries through the more regular channels of diplomacy.

The examples above illustrate that the contours of sustainable diplomacy are clearly present in Dutch policy. Practical circumstances are unruly, however. The examples also highlight the challenges

involved in making the transition from economic to sustainable diplomacy. The Netherlands operates somewhat ambivalently in this respect. There are rumours of a 'Dutch Diamond' at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereby much is expected of the pentagonal cooperation between government, companies, NGOs, the philanthropic sector and knowledge institutions. However, Economic Affairs and the policy surrounding the top sectors do not speak of a diamond, but of a 'golden triangle'. It consists of an alliance of knowledge institutions, government and industry. This approach keeps civil society organizations on the sidelines or having to fight for recognition of their position, particularly in the national debate. At the same time, it is recognised that "sustainability-oriented economic diplomacy" strengthens the competitive position of Dutch business in areas that are in great demand in developing countries. This is precisely where opportunities for Dutch businesses lie vis-à-vis their competitors from the BRICS countries. The Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW) argues in favour of 'sustainable development cooperation': policy aimed at the self-reliance of developing countries, which requires the use of the private strength of business actors, knowledge institutions and civil society organisations in areas in which the Netherlands excels.

Ambiguous frames in the Dutch discourse



Ambiguity leads to fragmentation or lower ambitions. The Dutch Good Growth Fund, for example, is divided into three more or less independent policy pillars, which are managed separately and are not (yet) linked to each other. The PPP facilities require co-financing organisations to take a very different approach to financing than their traditional financing basis. Smaller and more business-oriented organisations such as Solidaridad, Aqua4All or Woord en Daad (Words and Actions) in particular seem to benefit more from this than the big four (Oxfam-Novib, Hivos, Icco, Cordaid)^{xxxii}. The Millennium agreements are generally evaluated positively, but in practice they also left a lot to be desired.^{xxxiii} Major initiatives such as IDH are strongly committed to making international supply chains more sustainable, but an evaluation by the Development Cooperation and Policy Evaluation Inspectorate (IOB) concluded in a review in 2014 that IDH mainly contributed to scaling up sustainability initiatives through certification around standards. The effects of this 'in the field' on poverty, working conditions and environmental degradation have proved very modest for the time being. There is still no question of sustainable market transformation—IDH's higher goal.^{xxxiii}

The 'Dutch diamond' strategy is under pressure when the main carriers of this diamond (the NGOs, but also certain companies) cannot simultaneously respond adequately to the new policy instruments, either because their budgets are subject to serious cuts or because they have not been able to adapt to the new reality of sustainable diplomacy quickly enough.^{xxxiv} In addition, it is important to clarify the role that development organisations are supposed to play or not: will it be a diamond or a golden triangle? The necessary institutional adjustments are still being made within embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to improve policy coherence. In 2015, for example, a new directorate of 'inclusive green growth' was established to better manage so-called 'nexus' projects in interlinked policy areas—such as water, climate, food security and energy. The implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals also requires similar cross connections. The Netherlands intends to focus on a limited number of these goals. Where the most diplomatic added value lies, remains a matter of discussion.

In short, the Netherlands shows many interesting initiatives in the field of sustainable diplomacy, but the policy can be called fragmented to say the least. Sustainable diplomacy requires much more explicit emphasis on promoting cooperation between various parties, both in the Netherlands and abroad. Under these conditions, new and innovative solutions for existing global problems can be expected as a result of Dutch efforts. The embassies will play an increasingly important role as partners and much less as donors. The embassies will also be able to give strategic support to southern social initiatives for good governance in favour of inclusive growth. Multi-actor coalitions to increase investments in global public goods are becoming more important in any case, and the Netherlands has an enormous reputation in this area (the polder model). Sustainable diplomacy is not only about doing everything yourself, but also about facilitating, stimulating and coordinating activities that can be executed better, faster and more efficiently by other parties. However, little is known as yet about how the coherence between instruments of economic diplomacy and broader foreign policy can be improved. This holds particularly true for a small, open economy such as the Netherlands because budget constraints require choices. However, strategic cost-benefit considerations for these choices appear to be difficult to make. In 2012, the IOB decided to further develop this theme.^{xxxv}

[5] An elaborate example: sustainable diplomacy in Africa

In practice, strategic deployment of sustainable diplomacy requires concrete insight into the scope and nature of *all* international relations of both the Netherlands and the recipient country, in the political, economic and social spheres. To be able to make strategic choices and to determine where opportunities are being utilised or not, it is important to map out as many dimensions of this mutual relationship as possible. Ultimately, diplomacy mainly revolves around bilateral connections, which are often best placed in a more regional perspective. The 54 countries in Africa may form an illustrative framework within which strategic coherence can be developed and policy experiments can be assessed for their importance and relevance. Africa is also interesting because treaties are currently being most actively renegotiated there (e.g. South Africa and Malawi) and partnerships are most actively concluded. Moreover, Africa is the fastest growing continent that Europe is dealing with the most, both positively and negatively.^{xxxvi} Africa as a biotope of modern diplomacy, with the challenge of how to make the transition from traditional—via economic—to sustainable diplomacy.

In practice, sustainable diplomacy requires at least three types of strategic assessments, namely with regard to the most important 'channels' of interaction, with regard to the combined scores of these channels and with regard to specific policy areas that are considered important by a country. If we consider the figures over a longer period, two dimensions can be distinguished. Firstly, an absolute dimension, often in the field of traditional diplomacy, in which relationships are established with countries based on bilateral considerations. Secondly, a composite dimension can be distinguished, whereby the 'logic' of the diplomatic relationship is sought, as it were. In the case of economic diplomacy, this is linked to the economic interests of Dutch business. In the case of sustainable diplomacy, this must be linked to common sustainability interests, whereby the role of NGOs and citizens becomes more important. These dimensions are explained in the sections below.

Three bilateral channels




The Netherlands has bilateral relationships with countries in Africa through three channels: (1) via companies, (2) via citizens and (3) via governments. A strategic assessment of these relationships—as a basis for sustainable diplomacy—starts by mapping them out in order to distill patterns of mutual dependencies, but also to identify as systematically as possible any 'holes' that may arise. To what extent these gaps are important is, of course, ultimately a political decision. Sustainable diplomacy, however, tries to substantiate this political assessment strategically and to make it less tactical or ad hoc. The argumentation as to why certain relationships are intensified or expanded can therefore gain in depth, as can the political discussion.

Generally, only a part of this profile is mapped in considerations about the relationship between African countries and the Netherlands. This inevitably leads to fragmentation. For the period between 2002 and 2012, we have therefore listed the most relevant key data for these three channels for the entire continent. For companies and economic relations, this covers trade and investment flows. For political relations, this covers the distribution of the diplomatic missions' network and bilateral treaties. For social relations, this involves aid flows from Dutch NGOs and remittances from Africans working in the Netherlands to their families and communities in Africa.^{xxxvii}

With regard to economic relations, Dutch companies do business throughout Africa, which has led to a fairly wide spread of exports. Although Dutch companies are active throughout the entire African continent, 75% of exports are concentrated in ten countries. Imports from Africa are structurally larger than exports. This means there is unequal exchange. The Netherlands mainly imports raw materials—which are more subject to fluctuations in the world market—and exports products with more added value—which are less sensitive to the economic situation. Imports from Africa are also more concentrated, with more than 85% of imports coming from 10 countries. Mutual trade (linking of

imports and exports) between Africa and the Netherlands focuses in particular on Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Ghana, Angola and Libya.

The entrepreneurial perspective (2002-2012)




Foreign Direct Investments Reserve (2012)	Average imports from Africa to the Netherlands	Average exports from the Netherlands to Africa
		

Legend: black blue: >10%; dark blue: 1-10% on first map; 5-10% on second and third map; medium blue: 1-5%; light blue: <1% or negligibly small.

Deeper economic relationships are set up through bilateral direct investment (FDI). These appear to be highly concentrated in a small number of countries—Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt—where more than 80% of all Dutch investment in Africa is directed. The research in the run-up to the book '*Doing business in Africa* (2013)' shows that many Dutch companies that indicated seeking a lasting competitive advantage in Africa are increasingly coming to the realisation that they will also have to enter into investment relationships and partnerships.^{xxxviii} One of the current challenges for economic diplomacy is therefore to organise not only trade missions but also investment missions.

The largest Dutch companies that not only trade with Africa but also invest there, appear to be the most advanced in the implementation of sustainability criteria in their own business operations. Dutch companies, therefore, often enjoy a more positive image in developing countries than their competitors from other countries. At the same time, it must be noted that no large company actually operates in a sustainable or inclusive manner any more. Research by MVO (CSR) Nederland also shows that the *international* social involvement of Dutch SMEs is still fairly modest.^{xxxix}

The government perspective (2014)

Dutch diplomatic missions in Africa (2014)	Double Taxation Treaties (2014)	Bilateral Investment Treaties (2012)
		

Legend: First map: red: embassy

Second and third map: red is: present; dark brown is: ended; light brown: signed but not yet in operation

Political relations with Africa are mainly based on the principles of traditional diplomacy. In addition to old colonial ties, the Netherlands has mainly entered into diplomatic relations with African countries based on the size of a country and the size of its population. These, of course, are an obvious indication of the political importance of a country and the associated prioritisation. The key question, however, is to what extent full diplomatic representation is necessary or desirable. Dutch diplomatic presence in Africa has a clear preference for population-rich countries, but not necessarily for the most interesting countries as measured by, for example, economic growth or shared sustainability objectives. In 2015, the Netherlands had an embassy in all African countries with a population of more than 25 million—which amounts to 14 countries. There are 18 African countries with a population size of between 10 and 25 million. In terms of population size, these countries can more or less be seen as equal partners of the Netherlands. The Netherlands has an embassy in 8 of these countries, while a further 5 countries have a Dutch consulate. Five potential equal or more equal partners no longer have Dutch diplomatic representation: Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Niger and Somalia. However, a BIT (bilateral investment treaty) has been concluded with at least two of these countries (Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso).


The countries with the highest Gross National Product per capita (2015, adjusted for purchasing power parity) also produce an interesting picture. The two relatively richest, but also very small in terms of population size, African countries (Seychelles and Equatorial Guinea) have no Dutch representation or economic treaties. For the four following countries, with a per capita income of between \$ 10,000 and 20,000, the Netherlands only has diplomatic relations at embassy level with South Africa and Tunisia and not with Botswana and Gabon. The population size of the latter two countries will have been decisive in this regard. According to World Bank estimates^{xl}, of the 20 economies with the fastest growth forecasts for the 2014-2017 period, 11 are African. The Netherlands has considerable diplomatic representation with seven of these (DR Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania), and no or very limited diplomatic representation with three (Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Zambia^{xli}). All three had Dutch embassies in the past, but these have been phased out for reasons of political crisis (Ivory Coast) or austerity (Burkina Faso, Zambia).

A different picture emerges from the fragile states in Africa. According to the Fund for Peace rankings, at least 14 African countries can be counted among the twenty most fragile states in the world in the last ten years.^{xlii} Although the Netherlands has a strong ODA (Official Development Assistance) relationship with some of these countries (see below), diplomatic ties are much less strong. Of the

fragile states of the past ten years (a total of 16 countries), 7 have no diplomatic representation from the Netherlands. Not only small countries, but also relatively equivalent countries such as Guinea, Somalia, Ivory Coast and Chad are not directly covered diplomatically. With the exception of Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, no double tax treaties (DTTs) have been concluded with fragile states. BITs have been concluded with a much larger number of fragile countries (8) that are also in force, usually facilitated by an embassy located in the country in question.

On the multilateral side, potential risks associated with economic relations with fragile states can be mitigated if necessary. In particular, fragile states' membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) plays a significant role there. Important outliers in Africa are Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Somalia and South Sudan (in addition to a few smaller French colonies) that are not members of the WTO or have no observer status. This means that trading with these countries is riskier, since no international arbitration procedures are in place to settle disputes. If such a country falls outside of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agreements (MIGA of the World Bank)—as is the case with Somalia—the country is indeed a black box from a diplomatic point of view.

The citizens' perspective (2012)



Legend: first map: dark green: >€40m; medium green: €25-40m; light green: €5-25m; very light green: <€5m; second map: dark green: >5%; medium green: 1-5%; light green: <1%; very light green: no data.

The social relations between the Netherlands and African countries concern the relations between citizens themselves. These are generally shaped by Dutch NGOs that invest in countries mainly through Official Development Assistance (ODA), but also by expatriates who send money to their compatriots by means of remittances. These relationships appear to be highly complementary to economic (and in part also political) relationships.

The ODA effort is strongly related to the degree of fragility and the low (er) income per capita in the relevant African country. Countries such as DR Congo, South Sudan, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Uganda enjoyed a clear preference among NGOs. Fragile states that nevertheless receive little ODA support are Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Ivory Coast. Both the economic and political involvement of the Netherlands in these countries is extremely low (only one country with a BIT).

States that are not fragile, but that receive relatively high ODA amounts from co-financing are Ghana, Benin, Malawi and Mali. Among the fast growers, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania, Rwanda and Zambia also receive a relatively high ODA contribution (although often from a backlog).

However, budget cuts in institutional funding, in particular the largest Dutch NGOs (ICCO, Cordaid, Hivos and OxfamNovib—which until recently were dependent on development aid funds for more than 80%) force these organizations to consider their 'value proposition'. This has led, for example, to ICCO and Cordaid moving in the direction of a 'social enterprise'. Nonetheless, many NGOs also play an advocacy role. In the Netherlands' sustainable diplomacy strategy, they can be an important addition to the possibilities for influencing the Dutch efforts, or they can be an alternative to corrupt or failing regimes and fill in institutional gaps. The funds that are currently being made available by the Dutch government for 'lobby and advocacy' as of January 2016 are considerably lower compared with the previous financing arrangements. None of the major NGOs were able to continue all activities at the same level as before: in the period 2009-2015, budgets were reduced regardless of the fact that other sources of funding were used. The substantial restructuring also has consequences for their country portfolio. OxfamNovib, for example, has announced that it will halt all initiatives in Rwanda, Sudan and Zimbabwe. ICCO is withdrawing from South Africa. As a result, a part of the complementarity with regard to the economic and political relations in the Netherlands' country portfolio of the Netherlands will disappear. The question is whether companies and smaller NGOs can or should jump into the resulting gap.^{xiii}

The largest transfers from the Netherlands to Africa—remittances—are mainly to Morocco, Nigeria and Egypt. However, for some smaller countries, such as Cape Verde or Ghana, the relative importance of remittances for the local economy may be even greater. More and more countries in Africa are trying to establish a link with their emigrated compatriots through an active diaspora policy. Sustainable diplomacy tries to make this link economically sustainable. There are many diaspora initiatives in the Netherlands with the potential to further develop this relationship, although many of the activities are aimed at policymakers and NGOs, rather than at companies.^{xiv} In addition, a second-generation diaspora is emerging: African students who are studying in the Netherlands and looking for entrepreneurial solutions for their parents' original home countries.^{xv}

A final social category naturally concerns refugees and migrants who come to Europe. The flow of migrants comes mainly from fragile states or countries in a state of conflict. African economic refugees to the Netherlands mainly come from Nigeria (to which many remittances are sent back). At the moment, political refugees from Africa mainly come from Somalia and Eritrea. In May 2015, the Minister for International Trade and Development Cooperation announced that €50 million would be made available for economic development in Africa, which should ensure that in the long-term, boat refugees will not try to reach mainland Europe. The argumentation for this policy has clear traits of sustainable diplomacy: tackling problems at the source, with mutual interests and longer-term impact as the starting point.^{xvi} The implementation, however, is heavily criticized precisely because of the chosen country portfolio and the size of the budget. The €50 million comes from the Dutch Good Growth Fund, but the countries on which the aid is concentrated are Senegal, Ghana and Tunisia.^{xvii} These are not exactly the main sources of refugees, nor are they fragile states. The Netherlands does, however, have good diplomatic and economic relations with these countries. The Netherlands has no direct diplomatic representation in Eritrea or Somalia.

Sustainability through linking?

Sustainable diplomacy must be aimed primarily at establishing certain links between social, political and economic spheres and must particularly try to make connections where they are desirable from a strategic point of view, but do not yet exist or cannot yet be shaped. Table 1 shows an initial survey of this logic by correlating eight important outcome variables of sustainable diplomacy in a simple manner: in trade and investment flows, financial transfers from citizens (remittances) or via NGOs and through treaties and diplomatic posts. Table 1 builds on the information already contained in the figures.

The correlation number (between 0 and 1) indicates the general degree of dependence between the two variables. More important, however, is the extent to which this relationship is 'significant'. The

table indicates by means of an asterisk to what extent a relationship applies at the 10% significance level. Two variables with the same level of (in) significance can still differ from each other in terms of intensity. Since the number of observations is relatively limited and static, this technique remains fairly coarse and can only provide an initial indication of relationships and gaps in the relationships.

Table 1 Correlations in the relationship between the Netherlands and Africa (2002-2012)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1 Average Exports	1							
2 Average imports	0.6917*	1						
3 Remittances	0.5370*	0.3056	1					
4 DTT (taxes)	0.5142*	0.3004	0.4734*	1				
5 BIT (investments)	0.2247	0.1822	0.5715*	0.2463	1			
6 Diplomatic missions	0.3893*	0.4197*	0.4094*	0.4063*	0.5399*	1		
7 BDI stock	0.8816*	0.4835*	0.3436*	0.3545*	0,1137	0,1911	1	
8 NGO aid flows	0.033	-0.014	0.0325	0.2072	0.3338	0.3839*	0.0777	1

*significant at 10% level

Exports appear to play the most important role in all bilateral economic relations with Africa. The average exports (from the Netherlands to Africa) are positively and statistically significantly related to imports, remittances, diplomatic missions, double tax treaties (DTT) and investments. The economic links are the strongest. The presence of diplomatic missions and investment treaties is less important in this respect than the existence of tax treaties. Imports appear to be significant, but much less strongly connected with foreign investments than exports. The importance of diplomatic missions is more or less the same here. Bilateral treaties appear to be less relevant for imports at the moment. This is an indication of an unequal exchange situation which we might be able to label as successful economic diplomacy, but certainly not sustainable diplomacy. Sustainable diplomacy requires a strong (er) relationship between trade and investments. It is present from a macro-economic perspective, but the question is whether this is also the case at the entrepreneurial level. In order to investigate this further, it would be advisable to check with entrepreneurs, per sector and per country, what type of treaties are needed to mitigate the risk of investments in a sustainable presence.

Companies trade (leading to imports and exports) and make investments in Africa (foreign direct investments). With regard to trade, there are mutual relationships; for investments, the relationship is primarily focused from the Netherlands to Africa (with a few minor exceptions). The link between exports and NGO aid flows appears to be very limited. This can be seen as a gap in the sustainable relationship between the Netherlands and Africa. After all, in those countries where much help is given through the NGO sector—and where Dutch NGOs have also built up much knowledge about the situation of the local population—a better match with Dutch products (top sectors?) could perhaps be made, as a result of which exports to and investments in those countries can increase. As the NGO aid flows are significantly linked to the presence of diplomatic missions, the lack of matching cannot be attributed to the lack of diplomatic capacity.

The presence of diplomatic missions is generally also a very important condition to facilitate trade flows, remittances and NGO aid flows. Tax treaties go together well with exports to Africa, but prove

much less important when it comes to imports. This is an indication of the 'hub' function of the Netherlands, in which tax treaties for foreign companies play an important role in developing outward-looking economic activities towards Africa (exports and investments) from their Dutch location. Re-negotiation of double tax treaties currently takes place mainly with African countries. They could become a subject of sustainable diplomacy. Of the 23 tax treaties that the Netherlands has concluded worldwide, 10 were with African countries. Investment treaties, however, appear or turn out to be far less relevant for companies to settle in or trade with African countries. Investments by Dutch companies in Africa seem to take place to a large extent outside bilateral investment treaties and diplomatic missions. We have already seen in a previous study that Dutch companies have ambitions to operate more inclusively in Africa. This is always accompanied by a combination of trade and investment and is an excellent test bed for the application of sustainable diplomacy principles. However, the Netherlands' range of instruments, in particular in the field of investments and investment treaties, will have to be examined more closely. Interestingly, it is precisely in the field of bilateral investment treaties that diplomatic missions have been the most active. Relatively speaking, BITs represent the strongest correlation diplomatically, but they have had the least demonstrable effect on trade or investment flows. There appears to be a connection with remittances; a connection to investigate further.

The NGO aid flows are a variable that is not significantly correlated to any economic relationship (in addition to the presence of diplomatic missions). This shows that the NGO channel is clearly complementary to the entrepreneur's channel. However, it also points to an inadequate link between the NGO aid flows and the other components of diplomacy. Remittances are strongly linked to exports and investments from the Netherlands to African countries. *Remittances and NGOs aid flows are mainly complementary.*

Countries' poverty level appears to be an important explanatory variable. There is even a negative (though not significant) correlation between aid flows and imports from the relevant African countries. In sustainable diplomacy terms, a clear 'gap' therefore emerges here, and thus a clear point for attention for further policy.

Focus areas for sustainable diplomacy can be identified on the basis of this type of correlation: new initiatives may be needed to create a clearer link between social, trade and investment. If new initiatives are asked to link aid flows more to economic diplomacy, it would be important to examine to what extent in areas of new policy (see below) that link can be made for fragile and low-income countries in particular. The remittances of the emigrated Africans present in the Netherlands appear to be an underutilised channel. By involving entrepreneurial expatriates from prioritised countries more in the policy, new channels of reciprocal relationships can be created. The table shows that the institutional preconditions (treaties and the like) are already present for the countries with which the Netherlands has the most intensive remittance relationship.

Specific policy areas

Important criteria for sustainable diplomacy are attention to quality, a focus on sustainable development and a more detailed interpretation of partnerships between the government, companies and NGOs (and groups of citizens). In recent years, the Netherlands have embraced the instrument of PPPs, in particular for food security and sustainable water. The food and water sectors have been identified as top sectors, making the link with the Dutch interests relatively easy. However, the implementation of these PPP policy instruments is far from simple.^{xlviii} When strategically assessing the role of these projects for sustainable diplomacy in Africa, it is important—in addition to the substantive dimensions—to examine the patterns that arise in countries, in partnerships and in projects.

Since their introduction in 2012, the PPP facilities have initiated hundreds of proposals until mid-2015 of which a limited part (approximately 15-20 %) was eventually selected on the basis of fairly detailed criteria (a partnership and project check), which show important similarities with characteristics of sustainable diplomacy: a business case, a fully-fledged partnership between NGO, government and companies, common sustainability goals, a clear need of the recipient country, the embassy (mostly) as a partner and not only as a donor, a good intervention logic. The organisation of the two facilities—including the selection and recruitment of partnerships—therefore provides an initial indication of the extent to which the Netherlands has already managed to put sustainable diplomacy into practice in two important areas.

The embassy often played an important role in the selection of proposals, sometimes as the initiator of a project, and almost always as a co-assessor of the feasibility of partnerships (after a partnership had met a number of minimum requirements). At the same time, RVO had an important role to play as the implementing organisation. The awarded projects (see Table 2) reflect the support for sustainable diplomacy in the Netherlands: the interest of parties in the Netherlands in submitting projects, the extent to which they have succeeded in applying the new principles of sustainable diplomacy at a sufficiently high-quality level and the willingness and ambition of the Dutch government and embassies to steer this process in the right direction. The actual effectiveness of this new approach will only become apparent over the course of the coming years.

Table 2 lists the more than sixty African PPP projects that have been selected and started since 2012 in two successive tranches of the Food Security and Private Sector Development Fund (FDOV) and the Sustainable Water Fund (FDW), which has been given a separate tranche, Ghana Wash Window, for Ghana).

Table 2: sustainable diplomacy in practice: partnership projects started in water, food, private sector development (2012-2015)

Country	Food security and private sector development		Sustainable water		Total projects
	FDOV 1	FDOV2	FDW1	FDW2/GWW	
Benin		1 (b)*		1 (b)	2
Burkina Faso		1 (b)*, 1(b)*			2
Burundi	1 (a)	1 (a)			2
DR Congo	1 (a)				1
Egypt		1 (b)			1
Ethiopia	6 (a)*; 1 (b)*	2(a), 2(b)	1 (c)		12
Ghana	2 (a)	1 (d)	1 (a), 1 (b)	5(a); 3(b);1(c); 1(d)	15
Kenya	3 (a)*; 2 (b)*; 1 (d)	1(a); 2(b)	1 (b)	1 (a)	11
Malawi	1 (b)	1 (b)	1 (b)		3
Mali	1 (a)	1 (b)*			2
Mozambique	1 (b)			1 (c)	2
Uganda				1 (a)	2
Rwanda	2 (a)		1 (c)		3
Tanzania	2 (a)*; 1 (b)		1 (b)		4
Zimbabwe		1 (a)			1
South Africa	1 (a)		1 (a)	1 (b)	3

Source: PrC/Partnerships Resource Centre.
Legend: *project covering multiple countries (Kenya/Tanzania and Ethiopia; Burkina Faso and Benin/Mali)

Accepted projects appear to come mainly from countries where there is a Dutch embassy. All projects are *multi-stakeholders*, often with participation of companies, NGOs, semi-governmental institutions (especially in water projects) and knowledge institutions. Only two countries (Burkina Faso and Malawi) had no embassy participation and only one did not have a consulate. The bilateral nature of most projects is also striking. Only in a few cases were several countries involved in the project: two neighbouring countries were involved in two cases and in one case three neighbouring countries (the so-called GAIN project, in which DSM acts as an important partner).

The spread of selected projects among various stakeholders is remarkable: companies are in charge in 33 projects, but in 24 projects NGOs are in charge. More and more NGOs are emerging in the Netherlands that present themselves as 'social entrepreneurs' and try to increase their impact through partnerships with, often large, Dutch companies. The PPP facility appears to play, or will play, an important role in this respect. Semi-governments (4) and knowledge institutions (1) take a leading role much less often.

There is a strong concentration of projects in three countries: Ethiopia, Kenya and Ghana. Not only was the embassy very active for these three countries, many projects were also submitted by both companies and NGOs. The number of projects that were rejected in the selection procedure in these countries was also relatively high. Nearly all other countries that score well fall into the fast-growing category, although most of them fall into the low-income category. Fragile states prove difficult to mediate, although a few projects succeeded in Burundi, DR Congo and Uganda. Notable laggards are large countries such as Nigeria and rapid growers such as Ivory Coast and Zambia. Relatively large countries such as Uganda, Egypt and South Africa also score particularly low. In addition, the potentially interesting group of expatriates in the Netherlands is rarely used, as evidenced by the virtually non-existent score for Egypt, Nigeria and Morocco.

It also appears easier to apply the principles of sustainable diplomacy to themes such as food security than to themes such as water. Regarding food security, a link can often be made with markets and business cases. In such cases, partnerships are aimed at setting up international chains more sustainably and 'fairly'. The role of governments in such partnerships can remain relatively modest. NGOs such as Solidaridad appear to play an important role in this respect.

Only in the second instance (in the second tranche) did the larger Dutch NGOs participate more intensively in setting up project proposals. Sustainable diplomacy also requires that NGOs start taking new initiatives. It is more difficult to set up sustainable projects in the case of water projects than in the case of a theme such as food safety. This results, therefore, in fewer submitted and approved projects. More than food safety, water is a 'public good', whereby governments will have to continue to bear part of the financial coverage of projects. Projects from the Sustainable Water Fund with a more 'private' character, such as sanitation and hygiene projects, appear to be easier to organise privately. Semi-public organisations such as Vitens Evides International play an important role in water projects in particular.

Many rejected projects appear to have been set up by organisations that still work from the old (subsidy-driven) paradigm. This is also the case for reputable organisations that have won their spurs in these areas as a consultant, knowledge institution, entrepreneur or NGO. It is, therefore, far from simple to actually make a success of a concrete policy instrument of sustainable diplomacy such as the PPP facilities. The gaps are not only on the side of the government or in specific countries, but also on the side of the other parties that have to cooperate. However, the first steps have been taken, with more than 60 PPP projects currently spread across Africa, which will yield much information about the preconditions for sustainable diplomacy.

An agenda for sustainable diplomacy in Africa

This paper has argued that further framing of Dutch international policy is needed. The concept of 'sustainable diplomacy' meets the need to link policy areas more, and more strategically, with each other and to select more clearly based on the economic, political and social importance of the

Netherlands in its long-term relationship with other countries. Smart and pragmatic linking of policy areas is above all in the mutual interest of the Netherlands and developing countries. Inclusive and sustainable growth requires innovative solutions in particular, in which representatives of the government, companies and social groups work together to meet unfulfilled social needs. The initiative may vary from country to country. If the Netherlands learns how to handle this type of diplomacy properly, this could lead to substantial long-term competitive advantages, precisely because the diplomatic effort lies with several parties. The challenge for the Dutch government lies in linking these parties to each other on the basis of the right indicators and with the right incentives.


This paper showed the components of which sustainable diplomacy can consist and on the basis of which type of indicators useful overviews can be created. Based on this, further policy can be formulated and it can be determined where investments are needed. Sustainable diplomacy has long since ceased to be the prerogative of governments. It is precisely in interaction with companies and NGOs, occasionally supported by knowledge institutions, that sustainable diplomacy finds its added value. This requires a different role from the government. 'Less subsidy, more investments', for example, is difficult to combine with unfocused budget cuts. Investments in one's own capacities are also necessary, because this type of diplomacy cannot be developed automatically. But much more than economic or 'regular' diplomacy, sustainable diplomacy seems to promote the competitive position of a small country such as the Netherlands—with highly complementary but powerful groups.

During an internal discussion with the Dutch ambassadors in Africa on the application of sustainable diplomacy, a significant number of fields of tension came up for discussion. Ambassadors were confronted with major coordination problems, divisions and prejudices, different interests, the importance of a correct mix of the expertise of the posts, complicated implementation modalities, the tension between untied and tied aid, overpriced products from top sectors, how to combine different roles and not to get stuck in the role of subsidy provider, the time-consuming nature of cooperation, issues with reciprocity of the relationship—especially with regard to market access in Europe—and corruption. The ambassadors also emphasised that an important precondition for sustainable diplomacy is the willingness to have a long-term presence in a country and to invest and develop knowledge. This requires clear strategic frameworks, but also a switch in thinking and acting for many NGOs and many companies, which until now have treated the government primarily as a subsidy provider rather than as a potential partner. This limits the possibilities for taking risks and sharing responsibilities. Sustainable diplomacy is most effective if the partnerships can effectively build new institutions that close the gaps in developing countries to achieve sustainable growth in a productive and constructive way. Institutional space creates challenges as well as opportunities.

To illustrate attempts to address the coordination problems mentioned above, this paper has specifically discussed the relationship with Africa. This showed that interesting initiatives are currently underway, but also that some gaps still exist in the country portfolio and in the alignment with Dutch top sector policy, and that parties are not contributing sufficient quality to organise truly innovative partnerships with impact. Particularly in a number of African countries that are considered to be fragile or poorly developed, certain opportunities are not being used. This paper is, therefore, also a plea to further develop the introduced principles and techniques of sustainable diplomacy and to systematically collect the relevant data in order to learn from the experiences already gained, which incidentally are rather plentiful. It would do no harm to experiment more^{xlix} with current policy instruments, including in areas other than water and food security.


Scientifically interesting initiatives are also underway, albeit hardly in the Netherlandsⁱ. David Wellham was one of the first people to use the word 'sustainable diplomacy' in a book published by Palgraveⁱⁱ, although a link is made between ecology, religion and ethics in relationships between Christians and Muslims. One of the pioneers that is closer to the core of this contribution is Bo Kjellénⁱⁱⁱ, who wrote a

book at Routledge that advocates a new form of sustainable diplomacy to achieve global development goals. Moomaw and colleagues from Tufts University and the World Bank recently published an interesting impetus for a similar discussion in the magazine Global Policy in the United States, emphasising the negotiating capacities of sustainable diplomats^{liii}. Other recent studies encompass so-called 'environmental diplomacy' to ensure world peace^{liv}. However, these are all very much still in their infancy. An interesting recent find was a Master's thesis by a student in Prague, Pavel Dostal, who wrote a study on Dutch experiences with sustainable diplomacy, and uses the theme map on sustainable diplomacy that was published by the Africa Study Center in 2014 as result of the first collaboration project between ASC Leiden and the Partnerships Resource Center^{lv}.




[6] A further mapping exercise: sustainable diplomacy towards Latin America

The challenge of Dutch sustainable diplomacy in Latin America




THE PARTNERSHIPS RESOURCE CENTRE
ROTTERDAM SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
ERASMUS UNIVERSITY


The government perspective: mitigating risks through bilateral relations



Dutch diplomatic missions in Latin America 2016




Double taxation treaties 2016




Bilateral investment treaties 2016


The citizens' perspective: Dutch civil-society relations with Latin America



CSO* 2014




Remittances NL to LA 2015




Remittances LA to NL 2015


The corporate perspective: Dutch economic relations with Latin America




Investments of companies 2017



Inward Investment stock 2005-2016



Imports 2010-2016



Exports 2010-2016

Sustainably diplomacy in action: examples of Public-Private Partnership projects

What is sustainable diplomacy?

Diplomacy is the "art and practice of conducting formal and informal negotiations between representatives of interested parties". The function of conducting diplomatic negotiations is being useful to gain strategic advantage or to find mutually acceptable solutions to a common challenge aimed at fortifying relations between nations.


Traditional diplomacy involves in particular representatives of states and it focuses on issues like peace-making, defense and culture.

Economic diplomacy also includes the representatives of economic interests and focuses on issues like economic policy, standards and technology, trade, taxes and investment relations.

Sustainable diplomacy or diplomacy 3.0 adds the representatives of civil society to this equation and focuses on issues like sustainable development, human rights, ecology and the provision of global public goods.

Sustainable diplomacy implies new ways of cooperation between states, firms and civil society organizations. Sustainable diplomacy thus looks at interstate relationships as a cluster of activities in which firms (financial and non-financial), governments, civil society organizations – broadly supported by knowledge institutes – all play a role, in varying constellations. The Netherlands is amongst the frontrunners in experimenting with this type of diplomacy through so-called public-private partnerships.

This information was compiled by Rob van Tolke, Lucien Locht and Mónica Yáñez with help of several students of the RSM MSc Global Business & Sustainability. More information: www.rsm.nl/yc



Mexico
partnership between Uviver and Oxfam Mexico
period 2011-...
objective: safe water, protection on health and food

Dominican Republic
partnership between DSM-WFP
period 2011-...
objective: safe water, salt

Brazil and Chile
partnership between Rabobank and WFP
period 2011-...
objective: sustainable food production

Peru
social partners 2
project budget: € 2.6 mln
leading partner: Vitens-Evides International
period 2010-2017
sector: clean drinking water and sanitation

Bolivia
social partners 1
project budget: € 2.2 mln
leading partner: Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
period 2010-2014
sector: water resources conservation

Colombia
social partners 1
project budget: € 0.5 mln
leading partner: Colombian Coffee Growers Federation (PNOC)
period 2013-2019
sector: water resources conservation

Nicaragua
social partners 1
project budget: € 4.4 mln
leading partner: Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV)
period 2013-2019
sector: food crop production

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The challenge of Dutch sustainable diplomacy in Latin America

What economic, civic and governmental relationships exist between The Netherlands and Latin America? How can they be managed and coordinated to support a sustainable relationship and create sustainable outcomes? What new partnerships are created and how can they increase the impact of the diplomatic relationship? This is the area of 'sustainable diplomacy'.

The notion of sustainable diplomacy departs from that of real sustainable development and involves positive and mutual interaction between business, government and civil society – supported by knowledge institutes. Since the start of the 21st century, the Netherlands is amongst the frontrunners in implementing this type of diplomacy – which is also characterized as 'diplomacy 3.0'.

Managing a portfolio of complementary relationships

The challenge of Dutch bilateral sustainable diplomacy in Latin America is to manage a complex portfolio of countries which builds on the strength of different stakeholders. Next to this bilateral portfolio there are a number of other channels through which the diplomatic effort can be more indirectly channelled. European Union, Multilateral organizations like the World Bank or the World Trade Organization. These organizations represent a different diplomatic challenge which is not included in this poster. This poster draws three different types of maps:

1 The corporate relations maps between the Netherlands and Latin America shows with which countries the strongest economic relationships exist in trade and investment. Dutch corporate activities are relatively concentrated in a limited number of large countries. There is a strong correlation between imports and exports between specific countries in Latin America and the Netherlands. Investments are also strongly correlated with trade relations, while for at least two Latin American countries (Brazil and Mexico) the share of inward and outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is more equal than in the case with most other developing countries.

2 The civil society relations maps show where the relationships between citizens of the Netherlands and Latin America have the strongest ties, either as part of development activities or as part of remittances (financial transfers of money by citizens). NGOs have largely concentrated on a number of Andean and Central American countries. There is only a very weak correlation between the NGO aid flows and Dutch diplomatic relationships (through embassies and consulates). NGO activities also largely complement trade and investment flows. This points at an underutilized channel of involvement in the sustainable diplomacy map. The flow of remittances tell a different story.

3 The governmental perspective: the pattern of direct diplomatic relations and (economic) treaties is relatively fragmented, with considerable gaps and volatility. The presence of a Dutch embassy provides a strong predictor for the existence of a Double Taxation Treaty (DTT) and a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). But many countries are not covered, whilst some BITs have been terminated or not enforced. A survey amongst most of the Dutch embassies delineates a large number of challenges for entering and sustaining a solid corporate presence in Latin American countries. Even when some of the leading companies, like Unilever, Shell or KLM have been present in at least ten countries of the continent for very long periods of time.

Combined, the maps show overlapping and complementary country portfolios in which different parties can play a mutually reinforcing role. Sustainable diplomacy differs per country, per sector and issue. The willingness of parties to collaborate varies as well.

4 Making it work: the final box includes a map of exemplary partnerships in Latin American countries that represent sustainable diplomacy in action. The Netherlands has developed two types of PPP facilities since 2013: Sustainable Water Fund (SFW) and Facility for Sustainable Entrepreneurship and Food Security (FSE). But the number of projects that fall under these facilities in Latin America are relatively small. They are largely concentrated in the Andean countries and central America and pioneered by Civil Society Organizations like SNV, Woud and Deed, Solidaridad. In larger Latin American countries like Brazil and Mexico corporations (in food distribution and banking) have been taking most of the initiatives.

Some PIC publications on Latin America and partnering



Previous PIC maps



Download the sustainable diplomacy map of Africa through the following link: <https://prr-emissions.letteruniv.nl/handle/188.709027>

More reading: 'Doing business in Africa. A strategic guide for entrepreneurs' by Marjolijn Leun, Rob van Tulder and Peter Oelshagen (2013)

The challenge ahead

Sustainable diplomacy is 'work in progress'. Challenges and opportunities are manifold. The PIC supports this process by creating a learning and research environment in which (prospective) partners can exchange information and engage in (action) research on cross sector partnerships. Sustainable diplomacy needs input and support from all parties involved: NGOs, Government, Firms and knowledge institutes.

- Developing monitoring and evaluation tools to enhance impact
- Aligning government policies with corporate and NGO strategies
- Helping actors to make the necessary adjustments in their business models
- Building on each other's complementary strength (through partnerships) rather than using partnerships as a compromise
- For each actor: effectively managing a (complex) portfolio of partnerships
- Creating learning and exchange platforms for present and future partnerships

Sustainable diplomats...

...actively broker for cross-sector alignment and value added on the basis of:

- Complementary skills and efforts of various parties (building on complementary strengths)
- Pooling resources, contacts, knowledge and experience
- Local embeddedness (either through local NGOs, embassies or subsidiaries)
- Addressing the institutional void in host countries as an opportunity for new activities
- Sharing risks and responsibilities
- Creating conditions for more creative solutions
- Inclusiveness
- Longer term relationships and willingness to learn from experience
- Greater efficiency and effectiveness of the combined trade, investment and development agencies.

The Partnerships Resource Centre (PIC) centre creates, connects, and shares knowledge on cross-sector partnerships for sustainable and inclusive development and aims to understand how cross-sector partnerships work and how they can contribute to sustainable transformations. Knowledge on how partnerships work and how to measure their effectiveness is timely and relevant for addressing pressing societal, environmental, and economic issues. This becomes evident by the fact that partnership is foregrounded as one of the five principles which support the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as being included in SDG17. The PIC is an ambitious attempt to rethink the connections between academia and society. The centre aims at substantiating this ambition through three strategies:

- The PIC creates knowledge to enhance the transformative capacity of cross-sector partnerships. By conducting scientific research, the PIC contributes to city development about the transformative role of partnerships for inclusive and sustainable development.
- The PIC connects academic and practical knowledge to support mutual learning. The centre is rooted in academic, practitioner, and policy networks and aims to create feedback loops between academic and practical knowledge.
- The PIC shares knowledge to guide the navigation and strategizing processes of partnering. The PIC creates a collaborative learning ground for partnering tools and hereby fulfills a creative lab function. Based on our research findings, we develop lean tools that align with the strategic and operational challenges of partnerships and test these – together with existing tools – in close collaboration with practitioners. The PIC develops systematic and flexible forms of monitoring, data collection, process observation and analysis to pro-actively inform decision making in partnerships.

The PIC is an open knowledge centre. Findings and outputs are available to the general public.



We developed, together with a number of partnership organisations, a platform to enhance the effectiveness of partnering in general (<https://www.effectiveterminating.org/>) and for specific food and water partnerships (<https://ppplab.org/>)



Further reading on sustainable diplomacy and the Dutch diamond:

- Rob van Tulder, and Ton Dietz. (2017) 'Van Economische naar Duurzame Diplomatie', Economisch Statistische Berichten, 102 (4748), 168-171
- Rob van Tulder, and Ton Dietz (2017) Een pleidooi voor Duurzame Diplomatie, African Studies Centre, ASCL Working Paper 136 / 2017, PIC Working Paper2017
- Rob van Tulder (2016) Duurzame Diplomatie in een veranderende wereldorde, Internationale Spectator, 5 (70), 1-5
- Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AVV) (2016) Deedkracht door de Dutch Diamond. Onderwerpen in het licht van de nieuwe duurzame ontwikkelingsdoelen. <https://www-advies.nl/downloads/DeedKr53-2653-4633-63be-2767de2e0c3.pdf>

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https://twitter.com/RSM_PIC

Source:
 The maps were compiled on the basis of information from: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNCTAD (FDI and investment treaties), OECD (credit flows), Partnerships Resource Centre PPP database (on PPP facilities), worldbank (partnerships), ODI (Raided database (NGO involvement), direct communication with embassies and companies in grateful acknowledgement.

ⁱ In April 2017, the magazine *Economisch-Statistische Berichten* (Economic-Statistical Reports) featured a short version of this working paper: *Van Economische naar Duurzame Diplomatie* (From Economic to Sustainable Diplomacy).

ⁱⁱ See: AIV/Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (Advisory Council on International Affairs), 2016: *Daadkracht door de Dutch Diamond: ondernemen in het licht van de nieuwe duurzame ontwikkelingsdoelen* (The Dutch Diamond Dynamic: Doing business in the context of the new sustainable development goals); 4 April 2016 - no.99 <http://aiv-advies.nl/8j2>

ⁱⁱⁱ Nevertheless, the deviation from earlier 'classic' forms of diplomacy should not be exaggerated. Dutch foreign policy, as well as development policy, has always had an undercurrent of support for Dutch economic interests. See: Agnieszka Kazimierczuk, 2015, *Historical overview of development policies and institutions in the Netherlands, in the context of private sector development and (productive) employment creation*, ASCL Working Paper 122: <http://www.ascleiden.nl/publications/historical-overview-development-policies-and-institutions-netherlands-context-private>.

^{iv} For the period between 2015-2030, the United Nations agreed that systematic attention would be given to achieving seventeen sustainable development goals. See <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/>. From the Netherlands, a significant role was played by Paul Polman, CEO of Unilever, who represented international business in an important committee that prepared the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals), the High-level Panel on Post-2015 Development Agenda, established by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in 2012. See <http://deliver2030.org/?p=295> and <https://www.un.org/sg/en/management/hlppost2015.shtml>.

^v See Stefan Verwer, Lau Schulpen, Ruerd Ruben, 'Hoe nu verder? 65 jaar ontwikkelingssamenwerking' (How to proceed? 65 years of development cooperation'), 2014, Arnhem: LM Publishers; see also special issue *Internationale Spectator*, January 2014, (68)1

^{vi} See <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/subsidies-voor-ontwikkelingssamenwerking-en-europa/inhoud/subsidies-maatschappelijke-organisaties/strategische-partnerschappen-voor-pleiten-en-beinvloeden>.

^{vii} See <http://www.voice.global/assets/2016/10/VoiceStaatscourant.pdf>.

^{viii} See: *Minder pretentie, meer ambitie: ontwikkelingshulp die verschil maakt*. (Less pretension, more ambition: development aid that makes a difference.) Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Scientific Council of Government Policy), 2010

^{ix} Van Dooremalen, S en Quadvlieg, W (2010) 'Nederlandse economische diplomatie heeft overkoepelende visie nodig' ('Dutch economic diplomacy needs an overarching vision'), *Internationale Spectator*, 64 (2): 77-80

^x http://www.rijksbegroting.nl/2011/verantwoording/jaarverslag/kst169993_11.html

^{xi} Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011) *Nota Modernisering Nederlandse Diplomatie* (Memorandum on the Modernisation of Dutch Diplomacy), 8 april, House of Representatives, session year 2010–2011, 32 734, nr. 1

^{xii} This policy was expressed in five so-called knowledge platforms, of which the Knowledge Platform for Inclusive Development was a later addition during the Rutte-II Cabinet (2012-2017). The other Platforms had already been conceived during the Rutte-I Cabinet (2010-2012). For INCLUDE, see: <http://includeplatform.net/>.

^{xiii} <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/32360-A/kst-32734-1.html>

^{xiv} Ruerd Ruben, Lau Schulpen en Stefan Verwer, *Hoe nu verder? 65 jaar ontwikkelingssamenwerking* (How to proceed? 65 years of development cooperation)

^{xv} <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/53035-diplomacy-is-the-art-of-letting-someone-else-have-your>

^{xvi} S. Moons and P. van Bergeijk, 'Economische diplomatie is effectief' (Economic diplomacy is effective), *ESB*, 2011 (96)4616: 490-2

^{xvii} Peter van Bergeijk, 'Effectiviteit van Economische Diplomatie: methoden en resultaten van onderzoek' ('Effectiveness of Economic Diplomacy: methods and results of research'), 2012, IOB Studie

^{xviii} The BIT with South Africa served as an example for many other treaties. Now that it has been suspended, some governments are considering changing or even abolishing BITs. Venezuela ended the BIT with the Netherlands in 2008, Ecuador ended 9 BITs in 2008, Bolivia ended their BIT with the US in 2011 and is renegotiating with the Netherlands.

^{xix} Letter from State Secretary Wiebes, Ministry of Finance, 20 April 2015, countries with which the Netherlands is currently in talks are: Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Morocco, Egypt and Bangladesh; other countries that have a DTT with the Netherlands but with which no talks had yet been entered into in April 2015 are: The Philippines, Uganda, Moldova, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Indonesia, Mongolia and India. For the situation at the start of 2017 see:

<http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Agreements/LAPD-IntA-DTA-2013-01%20-%20Status%20Overview%20of%20All%20DTAs%20and%20Protocols.pdf>.

^{xx} Huub Ruel holds the International Business lectorate at Windesheim University of Applied Sciences, which mainly focuses on commercial and business diplomacy. See Huub Ruel, 'Diplomacy means business', Windesheim knowledge and research series, no. 46: See also: Okano-Heijmans, Maaïke, and Huub Ruël. "Commerciële diplomatie en internationaal ondernemen: Koopman versus dominee in de nieuwe economische wereldorde." (Commercial diplomacy and international business: Koopman versus pastor in the new world economic order.) *Internationale Spectator* 65.9 (2011): 463-465. And: Reuvers, Shirin, and Huub Ruel. "Chapter 1 Research on Commercial Diplomacy: A Review and Implications." Commercial diplomacy and international business: a conceptual and empirical exploration. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2012. 1-27, as well as Zuidema, Lennart, and Huub Ruël. "Chapter 4 The Effectiveness of Commercial Diplomacy: A Survey Among Embassies and Consulates." Commercial diplomacy and international business: A conceptual and empirical exploration. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2012. 105-140.

^{xxi} Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Karen Arnon, 'Europa moet investeren in grondstoffendiplomatie' (Europe must invest in commodity diplomacy), *Internationale Spectator*, 2014 (68)1: 29-33

^{xxii} Mark Dijkstra, Bastiaan Overvest, 'Het Effect van koningshuizen op de export' (The effect of royal houses on export), *ESB* April 2015, 100 (4708): 234-236; their conclusion:

^{xxiii} Costas Constantinou & James Der Derian (eds) 'Sustainable Diplomacies', 2010, Palgrave Macmillan, Studies in Diplomacy and international Relations

^{xxiv} For a discourse that links religion and ethics to sustainable diplomacy: David Wellman, 'Sustainable Diplomacy. Ecology, Religion and Ethics in Muslim-Christian Relations', 2004, Palgrave Macmillan

^{xxv} Many formulas for thinking about countries' growth paths exist, but it is generally assumed that 'inclusive growth/development' is best in the longer term for a country's overall economy and development. Inclusive development requires: (1) economic growth that benefits poor people more than average, (2) lifting socio-economic and political exclusion based on group characteristics such as gender, race, religion, and (3) focused effort to reach the most marginalized and vulnerable groups in society. See research by the World Bank and the OECD. Dutch development policy focuses on inclusive growth. See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) 'A world to gain: a new Agenda for aid, trade and investment', The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

^{xxvi} Rose, A. (2015) 'Like me, buy me: the effect of soft power on exports', *CEPR Discussion Paper*, 10713

^{xxvii} Chhewang Rinzin, Debberah ten Velthuis, Walter Vermeulen, 'The 'Successful Failure' of the Sustainable Development Agreement between the Netherlands and Bhutan', *Sustainable Development*, 2007 (15): 382-396

^{xxviii} Mirjam Grandia in her dissertation 'Deadly embrace? The decision paths to Uruzgan and Helmand '(2015) prefers to speak of a 4D approach: "defense, diplomacy, development ... and disillusion"

^{xxix} For a discussion on this theme, see: The Hague Institute for Global Justice, The 3D approach, 24 April 2014

^{xxx} Conclusion C. Matthijssen, 'Van 3D naar geïntegreerde benadering' [From 3D to integrated approach], *Militaire Spectator*, 1 May 2014

^{xxxi} See the study by the Partnerships Resource Centre, which outlines developments in the NGO sector in the period of 2008-2015 under the influence of changing government funding, 'State of the Partnership Report 2015 - CSOS under siege', Rotterdam: PrC : https://www.rsm.nl/fileadmin/Images_NEW/Faculty_Research/Partnership_Resource_Centre/CSO_Can_partnerships_provide_new_venues.pdf

^{xxxii} See APE/MDF (2014) Evaluation of Schokland and Millennium Agreements 2008-2013, Final Report March 17

^{xxxiii} IOB Review, Riding the wave of sustainable commodity sourcing - Review of the Sustainable Trade Initiative IDH 2008-2013

^{xxxiv} See xvii

^{xxxv} Ruerd Ruben, director of IOB in foreword to the study of Van Bergeijk

^{xxxvi} Marjolein Lem, Rob van Tulder, Kim Geleijnse, 'Doing business in Africa. A strategic guide for entrepreneurs', 2013

^{xxxvii} A poster is available in which all these relations are mapped. Can be ordered from: ASC/PrC, see: The challenge of Dutch sustainable diplomacy (R. van Tulder, E. Osmochescu, and N. de Vink), 2014:

<http://www.ascleiden.nl/publications/challenge-dutch-sustainable-diplomacy>

^{xxxviii} See xxv

^{xxxix} MVO Nederland - nationale monitor 2015

^{xl} World Bank Group, The Global Economy in Transition. Global economic prospects 2015

^{xli} As part of the budget cuts, the embassy in Zambia was closed in 2013

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- ^{xliii} See <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/> and the new Afrika-Studiecentrum theme map: A.J. Dietz & N. de Vink, 2017: No-go areas in Africa March 2017. <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/47428/ASC%20themakaart%2015.pdf?sequence=3>.
- ^{xliiii} See comments in Volkskrant, 5 August 2015
- ^{xliiv} An interesting initiative in this area is the African Diaspora Policy center (www.diaspora-centre.org). The partners that work together in this centre are mainly governments and NGOs, no companies are involved.
- ^{xliiv} The K.P. van de Mandele Fonds (in formation) tries to stimulate mutual flows of students and researchers from and to Africa and to link them to the principles of sustainable diplomacy.
- ^{xlivi} However, the scientific foundation for the expectation that investments and growth will lead to reduced emigration is absent and is highly questionable (see Ton Dietz's recent blog: Nine statements to better understand African Migration to Europe (April 2017): <https://tondietz.wordpress.com/>).
- ^{xliiii} See Paul Hoebink, 50 miljoen van Ploumen is ridicuul voorstel (Ploumen's 50 million is a ridiculous proposal), Vice Versa, 28 May 2015.
- ^{xliiii} See PrC two evaluation studies on the first phase of FDOV and FDW, 2014.
- ^{xlix} A number of learning initiatives have already been developed around the PPP facilities. These have been placed with the PPP food and water lab; see: www.ppplab.org.
- ⁱ Since 2015, Wageningen UR has offered a 'Master Track in sustainable development diplomacy'! See: Wageningen UR, 2015. Master Track Sustainable Development Diplomacy. [Online] Available at: <http://www.wageningenur.nl/en/Expertise-Services/Chair-groups/Environmental-Sciences/Forest-and-Nature-Conservation-Policy-Group/Education/Master-Track-Sustainable-Development-Diplomacy.htm>.
- ⁱⁱ Wellman, David J. "Sustainable Diplomacy. New York: Palgrave, 2004. Followed by Wellman, David Joseph. "The promise of sustainable diplomacy: Refining the praxis of ecological realism." Sustainable Diplomacies. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. 25-45.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Kjellén, Bo. "A new diplomacy for sustainable development: the challenge of global change". Routledge, 2008 (reprint 2014).
- ⁱⁱⁱⁱ Moomaw, William R., et al. "Sustainable Development Diplomacy: Diagnostics for the Negotiation and Implementation of Sustainable Development." Global Policy 8.1 (2017): 73-81.
- ^{liv} Tayebi, Sobhan, Seyed Fazlollah Moosavi, and Seyed Abbas Poorhashemi. "Environmental Diplomacy: A Framework for Growth of International Interaction and Cooperation for Achievement of Global Peace." Journal of Policy and Law 9 (2016): 150ff. And Susskind, Lawrence E., and Saleem H. Ali. Environmental diplomacy: negotiating more effective global agreements. Oxford University Press, 2014.
- ^{lv} Pavel Dostal, 2016, "Sustainable diplomacy: expanding the Potential of Diplomatic Relations (Lessons from the Netherlands)". Prague. University of Economics. One of the key texts he refers to is: Hocking, B., Melissen, J., Shaun, R. & Sharp, P., 2012. "Futures for diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st Century". [Online] Available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20121030_research_melissen.pdf. Rather than 'sustainable diplomacy', it uses the expression 'integrative diplomacy'.